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To Strike a Match
aétan Soucy’s La petite fille qui aimait trop les allumettes first 
appeared in 1998; two years later the novel was translated into 
English by Sheila Fischman as The Little Girl Who Was Too 
Fond of Matches. Soucy’s first-person tale unfolds simultaneously as an 
assigned secretarial duty, a confessional diary, a talismanic “book of 
spells,” a direct apostrophe to the narrator’s beloved, an infernal “gos-
pel of . . . hell,” and a “blasted last will and testament” (3, 135, 134).1 
The voice that addresses us, from the ruins of a family estate in some 
nameless grey countryside, is similarly complex: difficult to pinpoint in 
space and time, it speaks in an oddly extravagant pastiche of stylized 
“days of yore” (3), private euphemism, poetic neologism, inadvertent 
malapropism, comically blunt literalism, and snatches of contemporary 
slang — a peculiar mishmash of heterogeneous literary sources, generic 
discourses, linguistic temporalities, and cultural codes.2 Arresting in 
its strangeness, the narrative voice is also, from the start, unmistakably 
self-conscious of its estrangement in language, constantly aware of pos-
sible failures in comprehension and intelligibility. Because the novel is 
focalized through the consciousness of a narrator who inhabits language 
so tentatively, its plot and dramatic situation unfold for the most part 
obliquely, presented only indirectly via image or allusion or dispensed 
with altogether. For much of La petite fille/The Little Girl, the reader is 
thus left groping, as it were, in the dark.3
 Not only challenging, Soucy’s tale is also profoundly disturbing. 
At the story’s outset, the narrator’s father has just committed suicide, 
leaving two siblings to fend for themselves. As we gradually learn, the 
father’s self-destruction marks the end of a bizarre, sadomasochistic rule 
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that has “controlled everything” on the isolated family estate where the 
siblings have been kept sequestered (3). With the collapse of the perverse 
symbolic order represented by the father, the narrator is left “to take 
the universe in hand, my brother and I” (3). Raised to believe herself 
a boy — her telltale bodily “inf lations” notwithstanding — the “I” 
who addresses us is eventually revealed to be Alice, a teenager about to 
give birth to a child of rape by the same brother invoked in the novel’s 
opening sentence. Oblivious to her brutalization and isolated, semi-feral 
asociality, Alice is by turns philosophical and (terribly) funny about 
“the nature of the jam” that she and her brother are in once “faced with 
the fait accompli of papa’s corpse” (88). Over the course of her narrative 
— a two-part structure that spans a time frame of two days — she “re-
memories” her family past in fragmentary fits and starts, a recollection 
scripted with vivid help from the “dictionaries” or books that she has 
internalized. It is a family history warped beyond all recognition by 
the siblings’ now “defunct” papa, a figure seemingly omnipotent to his 
children but in truth a man rendered wholly impotent by an unbearable, 
uncontainable pain.
The agony perverting this insular family microcosm is ultimately 
traceable to a tragedy caused years ago by a third sibling, Alice’s twin 
sister. Playing with matches at the age of four, this twin, Ariane, acci-
dentally started a fire, maiming her and killing their mother. Maddened 
by grief, the father thereupon banishes Ariane to the dark “vault” of 
a woodshed on the estate. There, as “fair punishment” for her fatal 
attraction to fire, he has kept her confined, along with the corpse of 
her mother (the latter carefully preserved in a “glass box” [116]). Also 
placed in the vault, “out of reach . . . of course, but where [Ariane] could 
still see them as symbols and remember them and draw a lesson from 
them,” is a box of matches (134). This long-ago incendiary event is thus 
ultimately revealed as “cette étrange méprise au coeur du roman,” in the 
words of Bertrand Gervais (384), and the monitory matchbox figures in 
effect as the Pandora’s box of Soucy’s tale.
Referred to throughout only as “the Fair Punishment,” Ariane’s 
existence as a human being is disclosed only at the novel’s climax 
(which features a second conflagration). Largely because readers come to 
apprehend the horrific details of Alice’s actual situation only as “slowly 
as molasses” (115), the shocking sensationalism of the novel’s Gothic 
undergirding is skilfully baff led. Nevertheless, it soon becomes clear 
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that Soucy’s text presents a nightmarish subversion of the fairy-tale 
mode, particularly of the “favorite” courtly romance story that Alice 
recounts early on: “The story must have taken place in the real world 
somewhere, sometime, you see. In it there was a princess in a tower, pris-
oner of what you call a mad monk, and there was the handsome knight 
who came and saved her and carried her off on a steed” (11).
The romance fable elements highlighted by the text’s title and plot, 
together with the dark psychodrama of family history that plays out 
through that plot, have directed much of the critical uptake on La 
petite fille/The Little Girl to date. It is, for example, through the generic 
conventions of “both a fairy tale and a trauma narrative” that Lauren 
Choplin maps the novel’s representation of violence (169). Nicole Côté 
has examined “the death economy of female desire” in the text (157), 
while Maïté Snauwaert has offered a valuable analysis of the extended 
trope of the “family romance” by situating Soucy’s novel in the broader 
literary and historical context of “le roman de filiation québécois con-
temporain” (105).4 In an important early critical response, Bertrand 
Gervais reads the text through a subtle poststructuralist psychoanalytic 
lens, tracing “d’un processus de désémiotisation”: a discourse that ultim-
ately disintegrates to envision a psychological apocalypse or “imaginaire 
de la fin” (386).
Yet for all its resonance as memoir of trauma, desire, family dys-
function, and symbolic decomposition — and for all its otherworldly 
Gothic fairy-tale setting, “somewhere, sometime” (9), “once upon a 
time” (90) — the narrative of Alice, “the countess de soissons” (136), 
hinges as crucially on material details connected to a “real world” as 
it does on tropes of the Gothic, the Freudian family romance, or the 
Lacanian Imaginary. Notably, in its pointed presentation of a universe 
characterized above all by what the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch 
termed ungleichzeitigkeit — or the “non-simultaneity of the simultan-
eous” (Jameson, Postmodernism 307) — the novel offers a vision that is 
definitely as much “about” history in the broadest theoretical sense as 
it is “about” one specific family history or Alice’s subjective interiority 
and/or the reader’s psyche. Whereas Aurélien Boivin gestures at a histor-
ical dimension of the text in his attempt to read it as an allegory of the 
Duplessis years leading to Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, I want to suggest, 
more broadly, that it is through its seemingly strange temporal contra-
dictions and dislocations that Soucy’s novel reproblematizes history as a 
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process of “(non)synchronous contradiction” or the residual persistence 
of an “uncompleted past which has not yet been ‘sublated’ by capital-
ism itself” (Bloch, “Nonsynchronism” 31). In so doing, Alice’s narrative 
offers a re-enactment of a paradigmatic “revolutionary” shift, one that 
stages history as a social formation permanently marked by “the overlay 
and structural coexistence of several modes of production all at once,” 
an allegory ultimately epochal in scope (Jameson, Political 95, 97). 
The text’s preoccupation with historical forms of material produc-
tion and “real” estate, moreover, functions as a crucial precondition of 
its final and most singularly unsettling revelations, when Alice makes 
some essential disclosures about her own writing or “method of scrib-
bling”: that is, her mode of textual production. These disclosures include 
the fact that, as she reveals toward the end, she has resorted to writing 
her diary in a scribble “with just one letter, a cursive ℓ” (134). Although 
readers such as Lauren Choplin have noted that this “last move” by 
Soucy confronts readers with the theoretical impossibility of “the text 
in front of us,” the implications of this final “shift” from the level of 
“Alice’s interiority” to that of surface textuality (179) deserve closer 
inquiry, especially in relation to the novel’s non-synchronous “fantastic 
historiography” (Jameson, Postmodernism 368). For though the content 
of the novel’s plot traces a story of origins that leads back to a clear and 
present cause (the Fair Punishment’s tragic fondness for matches), it is 
precisely the story of the text’s own origins that is occluded from readers’ 
view. The novel’s very form in this sense enacts, in effect, a theory of 
history as an unclear and absent cause, of history as the thing “inaccess-
ible to us except in textual form” (Jameson, Political 35). 
What “lessons” might we “draw” from Soucy’s parable in this regard? 
Most obviously, perhaps, the text’s ultimate emphasis on the status of its 
own fiction abruptly subverts the transferential drama that the narra-
tive has all along lured readers into, as a powerful trauma memoir. But 
insofar as this moment also posits another hand behind the text’s origin 
— the necessarily missing hand behind its own history — it also raises 
questions of mediation and translatability that anticipate the artful hand 
of Sheila Fischman in The Little Girl Who Was Too Fond of Matches. 
In this sense, Fischman’s English retextualization of Soucy materially 
enacts questions related to the work of “the invisible translator” (to 
paraphrase Lawrence Venuti’s title [2008]), questions which otherwise 
remain largely implicit in the French novel’s form. As a mode of produc-
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tion invoked by the very premise of the novel, but also performed by 
the hand of Fischman, translation arises at various levels as a question 
integrally linked to “real world” issues of immaterial forms of property: 
namely, to problems of authority and literary “estate.” 
Finally, in the unknowable breach of its transmission from “cur-
sive” manuscript to the typescript “text before us” (Choplin 179), the 
novel ultimately comes as a reminder that shifts in media technology 
— specifically, here, the shift from writing to print — are themselves 
inherently translational processes, the transposition of “one kind of 
knowledge into another mode” (McLuhan 56). And in this most basic 
fact related to the production and transmission of this complex fable 
lies perhaps a final, latent, though timely lesson for the twenty-first 
century into which the book was launched. For both Alice’s emphasis 
on a “method” of production that privileges speed, and her narrative’s 
ultimate translation from manuscript to typescript, speak to features of 
our own “postliterate” culture (McLuhan 16), an era when among those 
things perhaps becoming history is precisely the old technology of the 
“cursive” hand itself.
But first we need to strike a match and orient ourselves in Soucy’s 
dark world, a world at once all the more elusive, and yet otherwise 
illuminating, in English.
Materials for a Fable of Non-Synchronous History 
The broken pocket watch produced at the opening of Alice’s narrative 
comes as an early indication that one of the things that does not func-
tion predictably in this world is time: her universe is one that we have 
“to take in hand” with a handless timepiece, a “watch that had lost its 
hands in days of yore” (3). The odd mixture of archaism and contem-
porary idiom that quickly comes to characterize her voice also reveals 
the decidedly strange “objective” world around Alice, a “worldness” 
that in its material detail suggests everything from a feudal romance to 
a modern, bureaucratic, industrial state.5 Consequently, the novel’s set-
ting tends to unsettle any easy grasp of a narrative present. What time 
is now? On the one hand, this narrative “now” has been described as 
“quasi-medieval” (Howells and Kröller 646): Alice, her “kid brother” 
(98), and assorted, wandering livestock live on a manor estate where 
the plow is wooden, music is made with “fifes, the f lipple f lute, and 
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the tambourine” (41), and Alice’s first reference is to a “very pretty” 
manuscript scroll “that goes back centuries or more” (4). Conjuring all 
the symbolic keynotes of the romance fable and its feudal social origins, 
the siblings’ manor estate or “kingdom” (120) is separated from a village 
by a pine grove, a magical space of “unobtrusive divinity” for Alice (64).
But that her “now” is a complex “universe” composed of “the coexist-
ence of realities from radically different moments of history” (Jameson, 
Postmodernism 307) is also suggested by her “manor house” itself. A gro-
tesque example of the “architectural uncanny” (see Vidler), this “quasi-
medieval” manor is also coded to standards of neo-classical aristocratic 
luxury, with all its attendant implications of distinctly decadent landed 
wealth. It is an opulence by now run to mildewed and blasted ruin: the 
mansion’s once splendid features — its belvedere railings, “monumental 
library” (82), portrait gallery, “vast mirrored” ball room (78), grand 
piano — are a wreck, warped and befouled by the elements. Its mag-
nificent chandeliers, now fallen to the marble floors in bunches, make 
Alice think of “overripe fruit” or “some disembowelled fly, its guts full 
of eggs” (79). It “is a veritable goldmine for little creatures” that live 
and die among the “rot and corruption lying around everywhere” (89). 
The same “manor house” that invokes the medieval origins of romance 
thus also clearly signals — like Poe’s House of Usher — the decline and 
fall of a “rotten” aristocracy in the centuries to follow, and the physical 
“corruption” of the family’s grand ancestral home, its advanced state of 
decay, insinuates — like Wilde’s Dorian Gray — fin de siècle forms of 
“degeneracy” among Alice’s folk, the suicidal, insane, incestuous, “sois-
sons de coëtherlant” kin. 
If Alice’s Gothic “manor estate” thus simultaneously evokes the past 
of a specifically decadent aristocracy, then this is a temporality also 
reinforced throughout by the distinct period style of the prose memoir-
ist whom Alice most consciously seeks to emulate, the “duc de saint-
simon” (Louis de Rouvroy, 1675-1755). It is to this embodiment of 
French Regency classicism that Alice in fact claims literary kinship at 
the very moment that she is first able to identify herself by a family 
name, as she tours the portrait gallery of her ancestors.6 She admires 
the eighteenth-century “duc” of the “sun king” court (99) for his “thun-
derous language” (73), his “extraordinary stories” (73), and most of all 
for his over-the-top, firecracker “syntax” (11), which “shoots up to its 
summit like farts from a burning log, I beg you to believe me” (73). 
86 Scl/Élc
Both the duc’s rhetorical and his historical example as a gossipy court 
memoirist — and staunch proponent of a France ruled by the nobil-
ity — reinforce the political subtext of a “slutty” or scandalous nobility 
that runs throughout Soucy’s novel. As with the uncanny architecture of 
their manor estate, the duc helps to cloak the “soissons de coëtherlants” 
(77) in the aura of the ancien régime, a distinctly debased past of “sun 
king” excess and entitlement (99).
So, despite the Fair Warning of the broken pocket watch at the out-
set, it is still somehow surprising to realize that the century of Alice’s 
“now” is actually early twentieth century. In this narrative present, her 
papa’s “magical generator” turns out to be a record player (39); the 
archetypal village beyond the forest turns out to be Saint Aldor, which 
boasts a “General Store” (32), a funeral home (“a special death shop” 
[34]), a lawyer’s office, and policemen toting pistols. The “handsome 
knight” who, according to Alice’s favorite romance story, is supposed to 
play the role of saviour to her imprisoned “princess” (9) turns out to be 
a professional “engineer” (112) and a “mine inspector” (51); the noble 
“steed” that he does eventually attempt to “carr[y] her off on” is in fact 
a motorcycle (110). And, as for the apparently medieval/neo-classical 
Gothic manor estate, that, it turns out, is a “veritable goldmine” for 
more than just “little creatures.” It is a “veritable goldmine” period. 
Alice intermittently conveys a vague sense of her father’s wealth and 
hints in her “re-memories” at some sort of business transactions — he 
keeps big registers locked away and has “pouches packed with cents” 
(“He had a lot and I think he used to go somewhere now and again to 
stock up”) (12). Incrementally, it becomes clear that her “papa” (22), the 
former “priest” and overlord who “controlled everything” on the estate, 
was also “mister soissons” (25) to the local townsfolk: a successful cap-
italist “doing big business” (22) as “the owner of the mine” (25). Among 
the riches hoarded by the father are “ingots” presumably produced by 
his “mine,” which he piles into crates kept locked away in the ballroom: 
“[I]t may be because of those ingots, in fact,” Alice muses, “that papa 
flatly forbade us to set foot in [that] room” (83). It is, then, as the heiress 
to some booming industrial means of production that Alice now con-
fronts a modern world of “strange birds papa called bearoplanes” (110) 
and of townsfolk for whom “the fact that my late father was the owner 
of the mine” is a matter of “serious” concern (50-51).
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The multiple temporalities marbling Soucy’s fictional “universe” sig-
nal more than merely an atmospheric sense of layered “historicity”: they 
point precisely, instead, to a vision of history as a process of ungleich-
zeitig or simultaneously “non-synchronous” realities. Initially theorized 
by Bloch in an attempt to explain the traction of National Socialism 
in Germany during the 1930s, the paradox of ungleichzeitigkeit, or “the 
non-simultaneity of the simultaneous,” attempts to capture the “con-
tinuing influence of older circumstances and forms of production, how-
ever much they have been crossed through” by the emergent or modern: 
“The objectively non-contemporaneous element is that which is distant 
from and alien to the present; it thus embraces declining remnants and 
above all an unrefurbished past which is not yet ‘resolved’ in capitalist 
terms. . . . [Such elements] are contradictions to the capitalist Now and 
elements of ancient society which have not yet died” (108-09).7 Jameson, 
building on Bloch, elaborates: “[E]very social formation or historic-
ally existing society has in fact consisted in the overlay and structural 
coexistence of several modes of production all at once, including vestiges 
and survivals of older modes of production now relegated to structurally 
dependent positions within the new” (Political 95). Whether we speak 
with Bloch of such uneven rates of socio-economic development as a 
“landscape” with “fields of a different Irratio” (103), or with Jameson 
in terms of the “coexistence of various synchronic systems of modes 
of production, each with its own dynamic or time scheme — a kind 
of metasynchronicity, if one likes” (Political 97), the applicability of 
such simultaneous yet non-contemporaneous “time schemes” to Soucy’s 
modernized romance fable is evident. Indeed, the very temporal disloca-
tions that mark in one respect the novel as fantastically otherworldly 
or dreamlike in their apparent disjuncture can be apprehended in this 
regard precisely as the manifestations of its deeply imaginative engage-
ment with the structure of history itself — nothing if not a compli-
cated kind of “real” estate, “crisscrossed and intersected by a variety of 
impulses from contradictory modes of production all at once” (Jameson, 
Political 95). 
Alice, in this respect, presents a textbook example of Bloch’s first 
premise: “[N]ot all people exist in the same now” (97). As the product 
of one of those “remnants” of “ancient society which have not yet died,” 
she and her brother — ironically “to the manor born” in the traditional 
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sense — have been brought up as though under feudal conditions of 
absolute rule by their father, who even caricatures the performance of 
noblesse oblige in his “inconceivable” (24) acts of “solicitude” (23) for the 
beggar man. A cul-de-sac of the unfinished, premodern past, the world 
of the manor estate represents in effect another form of “stoppit,” Alice’s 
term for the family predisposition to catatonic fits or “spells” that sus-
pend all “notion of time” (44). To the degree that Alice and her brother 
in their isolated “kingdom” thus reflect elements of an “unrefurbished 
past which is not yet ‘resolved’” or “sublated by capitalism” (Bloch, 
“Nonsynchronism” 31), their alienation from the money economy that 
structures the world around them is a principal sign of their alienation 
from — or “objective non-contemporaneity” to — the present. This is 
highlighted from the start as the siblings sit with a “pouch packed with 
cents” (12) and grapple with the question of “whether we had enough 
cents” “to buy papa a pine suit” (i.e., coffin). In order “to take the uni-
verse in hand” (3), the first task for Alice is to figure out what it actually 
means to take money “in hand,” as she literally has by the end of the first 
chapter, left sitting alone at the kitchen table “turning the coins over 
and over in my fingers” (14).
As Part I of Alice’s narrative traces her journey to the outside world 
of the village to purchase the “pine suit” for papa, the non-synchron-
ous or ungleichzeitig “contradictions of the traditional to the capitalist 
Now” are also set on a collision course (Bloch 109). In this regard, 
the first half of the novel — one day in the narrative time scheme — 
charts an extended lesson in failure at basic commodity exchange or 
the incomplete diffusion of commodity capitalism to the outer reaches 
of Alice’s time-stopped world. A reluctant envoy to the village to begin 
with, Alice is unable of course to negotiate any transaction for a coffin. 
Instead, she unceremoniously crashes a funeral under way in the village 
and is then apprehended by local officials, including her beloved “mine 
inspector,” the poetry-reading engineer who works for her father. It is he 
who informs Alice that her father’s “death was going to cause changes”: 
“There would be all sorts of problems with the inheritance. . . . The 
law would take charge of the matter et cetera and we, my brother and I, 
would be at the mercy of all those [towns]people” (62-63). 
Then the inspector delivered the final blow by saying, in a way that 
could drill a hole in your chest just like that:
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 “I doubt if your brother and you will be able to go on living on 
your estate.”
 In a f lash I was out of the room. (63)
Alice disappears at these words, running “full tilt through the village 
all the way to the edge of . . . the pine grove,” where she flings her bag 
of money away: “I pitched, yes that’s the word, I pitched the cents bag 
into the thicket and f lung three gobs of spit after it to ward off evil 
spells” (63). Money, exchange value, “the law” of property, “et cetera” 
ultimately make no “cents” to Alice as a genuinely non-synchronous 
“remnant” of an older and more magical mode of “being and conscious-
ness” (Bloch 106); modern society remains as unintelligible to her as 
she is to it. But the crucial element in the fable of history as it unfolds 
here is not so much the fact that Alice remains thus far unassimilated 
by capitalism as the fact that she and her brother are also, of course, 
simultaneously and irrevocably interpellated by that system as the heirs 
of their local economy’s major means of production, sitting as they are 
on their “veritable goldmine.” As Jameson notes, following Bloch, it is 
precisely capitalism’s “vocation,” as an emerging “cultural dominant,” 
“to subdue and incorporate” the older, “resistant and heterogeneous 
forces” with which it coexists (Postmodernism 159).
In the latter half of Alice’s account, then, the siblings’ predicament 
contracts to one of defending the premodern enclave of their “estate” 
against the encroachments of modernity: “[W]hat would become of us 
. . . [i]f it should happen that we could no longer live on our land?” 
(87). Alice clings to her landed estate not because she perceives it as a 
source of wealth but because emplacement is the only measure of “value” 
meaningful to her. In fact, the only trauma that she recognizes as such 
is dispossession of her “estate.” This she ultimately claims as a birth-
right in no uncertain terms: “[W]hat right has anyone to tear the coun-
tess of Soissons away from this land that belongs to her through all the 
nooks and crannies of her fiery flesh?” (136). In claiming “this land that 
belongs to her” on the basis of hereditary noble status, Alice not only 
invokes the obsolete aristocratic order that defines her but also reverts to 
a rhetoric of feudal class warfare that paradoxically casts the villagers, the 
very forces of modernization, as vandalizing peasant “hordes”: “They’ll 
come to our property in gangs! Entire hordes . . . ! They’ll take every-
thing away from us!” (71-72). Or, again: “Hordes would come to us from 
the village, ignorant of our customs, respecting nothing, understanding 
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even less, frothing at the snout, agitated and stupid as f lies, and they 
would dispossess us completely: of our estate, my dictionaries, the Fair 
Punishment too” (95).
Alice’s brother meanwhile mobilizes forces to drive the villagers 
away by getting drunk, loading a “cannon” (i.e., a rif le), and, in a feint 
of bravado, propping mannequins armed with broomsticks and mops 
along the manor belvederes (99-100). Installing himself as “raining 
king” (104) of the estate, complete with a faux throne, he undertakes 
a drunken performance of doomed aristocratic resistance against the 
insurgent “horde” of townsfolk (“there must have been a good dozen 
of them” in the end [124]) and almost pushes the novel beyond parody 
into farce. Both his murder of Alice’s “handsome prince,” the engineer, 
and his final self-abasement before the villagers — “kneeling at [their] 
feet with his shoulders on the ground and his hole in the air” (125) 
— are, however, searingly unfunny outcomes of the “revolutionary” 
conflict that comes to a head between the respective historical forma-
tions represented by the “soisson de coëtherlants” and Saint Aldor’s 
“villagers.”
With the siblings on the brink of imminent dispossession of their 
“manor estate,” Soucy’s text ultimately presents an allegory of that “tran-
sitional moment” in which distinct “modes of production or moments of 
socioeconomic development” encounter one another in open antagonism 
and “in which a new systemic dominant gains ascendancy” (Jameson, 
Political 97). On the most obvious level, the novel rehearses that particu-
lar historical shift implied by its specific range of period detail: that is, 
those “days of yore” in which “the values and the discourses, the habits 
and the daily space of the ancien régime were systematically dismantled 
. . . so that in their place could be set . . . the systems of a capitalist mar-
ket economy” (Jameson, Political 148, 96). But Alice also figures in the 
end as the very embodiment of the unresolvable non-synchronous his-
torical contradiction itself. A pregnant anachronism, she contains within 
herself both the “unfinished past” and “the new society with which the 
old one is pregnant,” the “growing child of the Future” (Bloch 113, 110). 
Thus, the labour that begins at the end of Alice’s narrative — the birth 
that now literally begins “to tear the countess of soissons . . . through all 
the nooks and crannies of her fiery flesh” (136) — promises to deliver 
the last “declining remnant” of an “unrefurbished past” at the same time 
that these labour pains signal the onset of new forces of production. As 
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an allegory of non-synchronous historical structure and process, this is 
an imminent birth ultimately less representative of any one particular 
“punctual event” in time (as Boivin has read it) than a reminder of a 
permanent “constitutive” pattern of transition “throughout the whole 
of history, as it were” (Bloch 109).8
In this case, the forces of production unleashed at the end of Soucy’s 
novel point either way to an “issue” or progeny predicated on relations of 
repression, exploitation, and violence. Looking backward, they promise 
to deliver the offspring of an incestuous, “rotten” past; looking forward, 
they anticipate the destructive “corruption” of commodity capitalism 
in which Alice is already implicated by her papa’s “big business.” If, as 
Bloch posits, “[t]he foundation of the nonsynchronous contradiction is 
the unfulfilled fairy tale” (112), unmet romantic nostalgia, then Alice’s 
story ultimately testifies to such an “unfulfilled fairy tale,” despite the 
persistence of her utopian fantasies for life with her child (136). The 
“handsome prince” of her favorite courtly romance story is dead; her 
manor is in f lames, as good as trapping her in a burning “tower”; the 
village “hordes” of the new Now have arrived. There is a blistering irony 
in her final vow not to become, “now,” “a martyr to hope” — “which,” 
she adds at last, “can happen in the best of families” (138).
The Missing History of the Text and Questions of Literary “Estate”
From the moment that Alice first introduces herself as “the secretarious” 
(3), Soucy repeatedly draws our attention to the issue of textual produc-
tion; scenes of writing intersperse her memoir. It is only at the end of the 
novel, however, after Ariane’s existence as the Fair Punishment has been 
uncovered, and the villagers are converging on the manor estate, that 
Alice casually mentions a few things about her “method of scribbling”:
[I]f any sly devil should stumble upon this book of spells he 
wouldn’t understand a thing, because I write with just one letter, a 
cursive ℓ it’s called, I string them together page after page, caravel 
after caravel, nonstop. For I’ve finally done the same thing as my 
brother, what else is there, I’ve adopted his method of scribbling, 
the writing goes faster that way and it’s the real reason I can’t reread 
myself. But still, by lining up these cursive ℓ’s I can hear all the 
words inside my bonnet, and that’s enough. It’s no worse than talk-
ing to yourself. Besides, what difference does it make? (134)
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Alice has thus been “talking to [her]self ” and — at least by the end 
(“finally”) — scrawling “just one letter.” A sudden metafictional swerve, 
the text’s “linguistic moment” (Miller 41), this sudden revelation of the 
“theoretical impossibility” (Choplin 179) of the text “which [we] are 
reading now” (9), is exacerbated by the fact that the library and the por-
trait gallery are already “burning fiercely” (131) as Alice makes this dis-
closure, the manor apparently set aflame by her brother. Furthermore, as 
“everything draws to a close,” it is also her (repeatedly) stated intention 
to make a “grand sacrifice” (125) of the pages that she has been scrib-
bling “nonstop” (134): “And so I shall immolate this book of spells, just 
as papa used to sacrifice the billy goat for the renewal of spring” (134). 
The logical double bind finally presented to us, then, is that we are in 
the grip of a story that has not only been (at least partially) composed 
of unintelligible “cursive” loops but also seems to be destined as fuel for 
the fire: truly, a “gospel of my hell” (135), an incendiary diary, a “last 
will and testament” (9) immolated in what seems likely to be the funeral 
pyre of its own author.
If the pocket watch that we set out with had had any hands, we 
might tell that all of this is calculated to arrive at the eleventh hour as 
a disenchanting jolt. Hocus pocus! The first-person “book of spells” 
that has so directly hooked us as participants in the drama of a deeply 
traumatized subjectivity announces itself as a reconstituted fiction at 
the very moment of its climax. The horrible “spell” of the first-person 
structure of address is shattered, and let that be a lesson in “the art of 
burning one’s fingers” in the blasted hell fires of fiction.9 The chagrin 
of readers “burnt” by their own investments in the illusion of mem-
oir’s unmediated authenticity is palpable: as Choplin puts it, “with the 
realization that what we’re reading is a written document that should 
be incomprehensible, we shift from what we think is an experience of 
Alice’s interiority to what is ultimately an experience of only text” (179; 
emphasis added). “We” might thus feel betrayed. The text has caught us 
in a “reader trap,” even though, once again, it has given us Fair Warning 
of its fictional self-reflexivity all along.10 
But the metafictional bombshell that finally shocks the reader into 
the realm of “only text” also signals at the same time, of course, “a kind 
of metasynchronicity, if you will,” another temporality with its “own 
dynamic or time scheme” at work, to recall Jameson (Political 97). As 
such, it is a moment of narrative self-reflexivity that logically extends 
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the concept of non-synchronous simultaneity even as it presents readers 
with a token of the text’s “theoretical impossibility” on a formal level. 
And, in raising a whole series of questions about the mode of the text’s 
own coming into being, it is crucial that the climax of Soucy’s novel 
foregrounds, above all, questions of textual history that underscore a 
glaringly absent structural cause: by what means, agency, or productive 
force has Alice’s “book of spells” been located and transposed into the 
text “which [we] are reading now” (9)? Insofar as it presupposes the 
missing past of an effaced editorial hand, Soucy’s novel points to the 
“formal effect of what Althusser, following Spinoza, calls an ‘absent 
cause’”: the notion of history as a structure predicated on “an absent 
cause [that] is nowhere empirically present as an element” (Jameson, 
Political 102, 36). Just as the “nowhere empirically present” textual his-
tory of Alice’s memoir can be apprehended only as an “effect,” as the 
narrative “which [we] are reading now,” so too in Althusser’s concep-
tion can the absent cause of history “be apprehended only through its 
effects, and never directly as some reified force” (102). The “notion of 
History or the Real as an ‘absent-cause’” posits the past as a “totality” 
never “available for representation, any more than it is accessible in the 
form of some ultimate truth” (55).
If the production history of the text is specifically marked as an 
unknowable occlusion, then, that is the point: such foreclosure is the 
condition foundational to our knowledge of any past. History as an 
absent cause is the unrepresentable, a site of “impossibility” as such. 
“Conceived in this sense, History,” as Jameson also famously put it, “is 
what hurts, it is what refuses desire” (Political 102). Hence the text’s 
ultimate resistance to the reader’s desire, its pre-emptive cancellation of 
her empathetic identification with its protagonist, by “suddenly barring 
us from” an “experience of Alice’s interiority” (Choplin 179). Only at 
a basic thematic level a trauma narrative about subjective or privatized 
histories of pain — a family hurt traced back to a cause embodied in 
Ariane, the Fair Punishment — La petite fille/The Little Girl reaches 
much further as a formal demonstration and philosophical lesson, too, 
on how it is that history hurts.
But the question with which Alice ends her description of her “meth-
od of scribbling” — “Besides, what difference does it make?” — war-
rants further pressing. The leap in the text’s fictional premise from a 
series of “cursive ℓ’s” that traces an inner monologue to the order of the 
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reconstituted story “which [we] are reading now” does indeed make 
a “difference” (9). This is specifically so when one considers that the 
labour implied by this story’s reproduction — precisely that process 
which the text remains silent on — exceeds curatorial transmission and 
editorial transcription to imply work that is also translational in nature, 
entailing, in fact, no less than a certain fantastic capacity for decipher-
ment and übersetzung.11 On the one hand, this means that it is more pre-
cise to say that the actual “theoretical impossibility” of Soucy’s text lies 
in its apparent translatability from the inaccessible realm of the absent 
cause (or the Real) into a symbolic order in the first place. As Walter 
Benjamin reminds us, “[t]he question of whether a work is translatable” 
includes “whether by its very essence it allows itself to be translated and 
thus . . . calls for it” (76). Neither as an “imperfectly intelligible” scrawl 
(13) nor, theoretically, as a figure of history’s absent cause does Alice’s 
“book of spells” thus call for translation. Yet, in effect, that is very much 
how her memoir asks to be read: as a “life” already in translation from 
the start, even when the text is read in its original French. Rather than 
presenting us with a coherent copy of first-hand experience, the text 
offers us the prospect of a memoir written (at least partly) in a sort of 
proto-language of “just one letter,” a cartoon of cryptic script presum-
ably processed through the scrim of some transcendentally talented 
“sly devil” of a translator/cryptographer who has cracked the code of 
Alice’s radically abridged “one letter” mode of composition like some 
Rosetta Stone. To the degree that translation involves “a ‘spelling out’ 
of forms of knowledge” (McLuhan 56), we might even say that the text 
posits some unknown other who “must have . . . somewhere, sometime, 
you see” (9), “stumbl[ed] upon this book of spells” to spell out all those 
“strings” of “cursive ℓs” for us (134).
Intrinsic to the very premise of La petite fille are thus issues that usu-
ally cluster around reading a text in translation — which might be to 
say a great deal or not much at all, given that even translation experts 
acknowledge “there is no consensus about what translation is” (Venuti, 
“Translation, Intertextuality”). Does it include, for example, that form 
of intralingual translation also invoked throughout the narrative via 
Alice’s own struggles as a subject self-consciously estranged in language? 
Certainly, constant reference to her “dictionaries” (73) as Alice strives to 
“find the words” (37) that she needs for the “actual name[s]” of things 
(73), to locate “exactly the correct term, if such a thing exists” (107), and 
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her compulsive editorial corrections and anxieties about “the meanings 
of words” and proper usage (“if I dare put it this way”) enact a labour 
in language that approximates “The Translator’s Task.” In other words, 
as Alice struggles to translate her experience into language, she herself 
illustrates the first in a series of “language transfer” (Cronin 474) activ-
ities to follow: namely, those of the missing hand behind the preparation 
of her cryptic “book of spells” and ultimately those of Fischman in her 
actual translation of La petite fille into The Little Girl.12 
It is important that the act of fantastic decoding that “spells out” 
Alice’s manuscript of “memories, if that’s what they are” (94; emphasis 
added), proposes a conception of translation that exceeds any relation-
ship of equivalence between two different orders of signification (“if 
such a thing exists”), pointing instead to what Lawrence Venuti terms 
a “hermeneutic model of translation”: namely, the idea that transla-
tion is always “an act of inscription that communicates one interpreta-
tion — or set of interpretations — of the source text” (“Translation, 
Intertextuality”). In this sense, if La petite fille already complicates the 
notion of the text as “faithfully transcribed” by Alice and by her manu-
script’s invisible translator (21), then this goes doubly so for readers of 
Fischman’s The Little Girl, who are additionally confronted with a text 
transmuted by the interpretive hand of an actual translator.13 To read 
The Little Girl in translation thus amplifies an awareness of the mediat-
ing power and “iterability of language” in Derrida’s sense, underscoring 
the need for a critically self-aware “hermeneutic” model of reading in 
translation and in effect warning us against placing “boundless trust” 
in the “fidelity” of any translator (Johnson 142).14 
“Translation is writing; that is, it is not translation only in the sense 
of transcription,” as Derrida observed. “It is a productive writing called 
forth by the original text.”15 To the degree that translation produces a 
text that is more or less “relatively autonomous from the source text” 
(Venuti, “Translation, Intertextuality”), its status as a creative act of 
interpretation, as a productive “mode” in its own right (Benjamin 75), 
thus extends fundamental questions about authority, ownership, and 
control of meaning.16 As Lori Chamberlain has argued, “the transforma-
tion of translation” in recent critical theory “from a reproductive activity 
into a productive one, from a secondary work into an original work, 
indicates the coding of translation rights as property rights — signs of 
riches, signs of power.” It is in part through “the metaphorics of transla-
96 Scl/Élc
tion” that “the struggle for authorial rights takes place” (261). In fact, 
according to Chamberlain, “the reason translation is so over-coded, 
so over-regulated,” in copyright law as in literary history, is precisely 
because “it threatens to erase the difference between production and repro-
duction which is essential to the establishment of power. Translation 
can [for instance] masquerade as original, thereby short-circuiting the 
system” of author-based literary capital altogether (262-63; emphasis 
added). With its intrinsically subversive potential to burn down the 
Author’s house, translation remains a suspect and therefore marginal-
ized mode of cultural production, a point that Fischman, for one, has 
also commented upon.17
By embedding the ambiguous mode of translation as the very prem-
ise of its own fiction, Soucy’s text, and Fischman’s rendition of it, point 
beyond the “veritable goldmine” of Alice’s literal manorial estate to 
foreground the more intangible and complex commodity of the “liter-
ary estate” itself. “Just try explaining . . . what it means to be master of 
an estate!” Alice exclaims at one point (100). In a narrative as indeter-
minately produced/reproduced as this “last will and testament,” it is 
the “property rights” and boundary issues raised by multiple levels of 
translation that are perhaps most likely to defy such “explaining.”
Vanishing Points: The Cursive Hand, a Burning “Bookhouse”
The “very pretty” illuminated manuscript that Alice consults at the 
outset of her narrative is an early marker of The Little Girl ’s preoccupa-
tions with the old “scribal art” of writing (LG 4; McLuhan 173). Soucy’s 
recurrent focus on Alice in the act of textual production — “forging” 
ahead with her “pencil” as “the sheets of paper . . . pil[e] up” — clearly 
reinforces her existence within a non-synchronous temporal lag, a “still 
archaic handicraft enclave” and “holdover” within a modernized world 
of books, motorcycles, and other forms of mechanical, mass reproduc-
tion (Jameson, Postmodernism 307). Consonant with the novel’s larger 
historical vision of “archaic feudal structures” giving way to “irresistible 
modernizing tendencies” (309), the text’s attention to Alice’s cursive 
labour also reinscribes the ontological rupture between the pages that 
Alice produces and the ones that we “are reading now” (9). Itself an 
integral reminder of the text’s problematization of history as an unrep-
resentable “absent cause,” this shift from a mode of writing to print 
represents a crucial final extension of its invitation to contemplate our 
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reliance on various forms of translation, which in this case are inter-
medial in nature. In this instance, however, what the translation and 
displacement of an older mode of textual production by a newer mode 
ultimately underscore is the very principle of constant repetition driving 
such transitions over time, as “episodes in a single vast unfinished plot,” 
a “vaster historical rhythm” (Jameson, Political 20, 96). 
From our point in time, it might actually bear reminding that 
writing no less than print is a technology, and “technologies are ways 
of translating one kind of knowledge into another mode,” as theor-
ists from Benjamin to McLuhan have established (McLuhan 56).18 
Interestingly, whereas Benjamin, in “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” charted the transition to mass culture in 
terms of the loss of the original’s “aura,” McLuhan’s analysis in his 1964 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man accentuated, historically 
speaking, the aura or “magic” of mechanization or, as McLuhan termed 
it, “the typographic spell” of the reproduction in the new era of print 
culture:
In amplifying and extending the written word, typography revealed 
and greatly extended the structure of writing. . . . [T]he identical 
character of several books . . . is after all the most magical and 
potent aspect of print and mass production. . . . The printed book 
based on typographic uniformity and repeatability in the visual 
order was the first teaching machine, just as typography was the 
first mechanization of a handicraft. (19, 174)
Mechanical reproduction is obviously unlike translation in that “the 
message of print and typography is primarily that of repeatability” or 
“identical” replication (McLuhan 160).19 That message of identical 
reproduction might be subliminal by now, but it is no less “potent” 
for that. This is to suggest that, as much as anything else, it is a “typo-
graphic spell” that surcharges Alice’s “book of spells” with a “magical 
and potent aspect.” For the message of identical repeatability inherent to 
the typographic form itself reinforces precisely that illusion of mimetic 
fidelity crucial to our investment in her “faithfully transcribe[d]” first-
person diary from the start (21). As opposed to what Alice describes 
as her “minuscule, crowded writing” (102), the neat uniformity of the 
novel’s typography supplies implicit reassurance of a protagonist who 
is objectively “recording the facts,” as she asserts, “with probity and 
simplicity” (85).
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Viewed as integral to its textual strategies as well as incidental to its 
form, the novel’s self-conscious distinction between writing and typ-
ography also speaks directly to the present in its twin concerns with 
memory and speed. Print, of course, “provided a vast new memory for 
past writings that made a personal memory inadequate,” just as digital 
prostheses today provide the most adequate outsourcing for our mem-
ories (McLuhan 174). Rehearsed under her bonnet as she talks to her-
self, Alice’s memories prove to be “inadequate” because, as we recall, 
Alice is not really writing them out completely, at least not always. “It’s 
the real reason,” as she says, that she “can’t re-read” herself, though 
we, who follow her past writings through the “new memory” afforded 
by the “magic” of her manuscript’s translator and of print, can (134). 
And the “method of scribbling” that Alice resorts to has everything 
to do with that tricky missing hand of time. It is the hyperefficient, 
“bullet”-like speed of her writing method that she constantly stresses 
(“clear the tracks, it’s coming fast” [97]), and that her run-on construc-
tions reinforce, even before “everything draws to a close” (125) and she 
recognizes that “I have very little time and I won’t have had enough to 
recount everything.” In essence, what Alice wants is a technology that 
can keep up to her thoughts, a “cognitive automaticity, the ability to 
think as fast as possible, freed as much as can be from the strictures of 
whichever technology we must use to record our thoughts” (Trubek 37). 
As writing fails her, she (pragmatically) adopts her brother’s shorthand 
technique: “[W]hat else is there . . . the writing goes faster that way” 
(134).
Filling her pages “without stopping . . . at a speed that can break 
necks” (97), Alice’s compositional method prioritizes precisely the 
same characteristic of the “speed up and exchange of information,” the 
increasing rapidity, that McLuhan stressed in his wide-angled historical 
analysis of new media. In superseding writing as a cultural dominant, 
not only did mechanized print technology usher in “a speed of informa-
tion movement unknown before printing,” but speed also constituted 
the key element of what McLuhan foresaw back in the 1960s as the 
“postliterate,” “electronic” culture that lay ahead (177, 24). Importantly, 
as Gregory Betts has recently observed,
McLuhan coined the term “postliterate” to represent an era not 
when humanity has given up reading [or writing] but when the 
traditional function of reading and literature has been so tremen-
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dously altered by the acceleration of production and distribution of 
information that the entire nature of the activity has changed. . . . 
The postliterate era . . . introduces a profound increase in the speed 
of information gathering. (260)
Likewise “tremendously altered by the acceleration” of its own break-
neck speed of production, Alice’s manuscript ironically also ends up 
challenging readers’ conceptions of “the entire nature of the activity” of 
writing. Reconstituted in print by another, absent hand, it then raises 
further questions about the status or “traditional function of reading 
and literature,” as we have seen. In this sense, despite the fundamental 
anachronism of its originally “scribal” mode, and the complex blend 
of its self-consciously preliterate and highly literate aristocratic voice, 
Alice’s diary is also apt to resonate uniquely within the context of a 
postliterate culture.20
 Driven by the same imperative for speed, efficiency, and auto-
mation, the “postliterate” paradigm transforming textual practices 
today has affected foremost perhaps the old “art” of handwriting itself. 
The cursive hand that produced the manuscript, whether centuries old 
and “illuminated” or a string of “cursive ℓ’s,” provides perhaps the old-
est surviving example of a premodern technology in our own society’s 
“overlay and structural coexistence of several modes of production.” The 
possible death of handwriting, like the gradual corruption of books by 
“mildew and damp” in Alice’s library, will likely unfold as “a long and 
slow” demise (73). Still, in the interactive, “postliterate” now, the time 
for cursive script, like Alice’s time, seems to “draw to a close” (125), a 
handiwork increasingly supplanted by the more instantaneous produc-
tivities of the postmodern and the posthuman. The culture of nostalgia 
infusing current debates over the fate of handwriting is one sure sign 
of its decline.21
If the end of Alice’s cursive hand in some sense “spells out” the end 
of handwriting, and if Soucy’s text thus literally embodies the “cultural 
dominant” of a print technology “on the point of . . . blotting out” 
the older art (Jameson, Postmodernism 307), then there might be an 
intimation reaching yet further in the spectacular omen of the burning 
“bookhouse” at the narrative’s conclusion, an implicit recognition of the 
ultimate impermanence of that “dominant” print culture and technol-
ogy itself. At least, the “grand sacrifice” of the printed word envisioned 
by the novel’s closing conflagration (125), the incineration of books 
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along with Alice’s handwritten pages, suggests something of that larger 
pattern of the passage of modes of production as a “perpetual . . . consti-
tutive structure” of history (Jameson, Political 97). As the “monumental 
library” of her “earthly abode” (82) goes up “smoking and f laming” 
(131), in the end, Alice muses that she will “fetch tomorrow . . . what’s 
left of the charred library” (136): “[S]ome [books,] I dare believe, will 
have been spared — you wouldn’t think so but dictionaries are tough, 
they have the calm obstinacy of the wood from which they’re born, 
trees could give us no gifts more beautiful” (136). At the same time, it 
is clear that “with such a fire” the villagers “might as well have tried to 
put it out with spit, that wouldn’t have changed a hell of a lot, if you 
want my opinion” (131).
The question of what will remain, including Alice’s own fate, ultim-
ately remains unresolved. Maybe our heroine, along with a few “tough” 
books, will survive this closing inferno. In another sense, they have 
both already been reduced to “dolls of ash,” as signifiers on the page 
of a self-conscious fiction (133). Moreover, we already know that even 
the most “obstinate” books in this library are destined to succumb to a 
“slow and inexorable work of invasion . . . [that] is exerting its powers 
on our estate.” “[T]he dictionaries are dying a natural death like all the 
rest — corruption! do your duty” (73). Although “a natural death” is 
thus just a matter of time, Alice’s narrative nevertheless ends at a critical 
moment of imminent birth and/or death, a moment of pure potentiality 
that points to the inevitability of another day but does not “spell out” 
that future, either.
In 1864, Mallarmé famously wrote that “the world exists to end in 
a book,” to which McLuhan, in 1964, added the following postscript: 
“We are now in a position to go beyond that and to transfer the whole 
show to the memory of a computer” (59). A more recent historian of 
translation and information technology, Michael Cronin, speaks of the 
coming “Translation Age” as an age of “Everyware,” an “information-
immersive environment” of “ubiquitous computing” akin in its effects 
to the introduction of electricity (475). Written and translated at the 
turn of the twenty-first century, The Little Girl Who Was Too Fond of 
Matches looks back to the past of a private family “hell” struck up by the 
original, accidental cause of Ariane’s match to excavate a “fantastic his-
toriography” also significant for “tomorrow” in its implications. Within 
a narrative time frame of two days, beginning with an act of suicide and 
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ending with an act of libricide, Soucy conjures a universe that hints at 
the end of Mallarmé’s world of books, too, even as it also refuses to “go 
beyond that and . . . transfer the whole show,” in McLuhan’s words, to 
any definite “tomorrow,” digital or otherwise. How long the present, 
or the residue of any incomplete past, might persist as a leftover in the 
future is uncertain. What seems more certain is that Soucy’s parable 
is one of change that causes pain. Whether destructive or productive, 
the universe of pain is almost always instructive and reverberates across 
languages. Pain is perhaps the only invariable effect of history’s absent 
hand — that invisible but not otherworldly hand that we know must be 
there, “somewhere . . . you see,” if only by the brief flare of a match (11).
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Notes
1 Soucy’s dramatic sequel to the novel, Catoblépas (Boréal, 2001), remains untranslated.
2 Critics who have taken up the novel’s “innovative lexicon” include Gervais, Marcheix, 
and Whelan. Whelan offers a linguistic analysis of the device of comparison in the novel.
3 Nevertheless, the novel remained at the top of French-language bestseller lists for 
the better part of a year and attracted considerable notoriety upon publication. As Soucy’s 
most acclaimed work, it was shortlisted for France’s prestigious Prix Renaudot, among other 
prizes. On the “sensation” caused by its publication, see Howells and Kröller; and Woods. In 
the wake of Soucy’s sudden death in 2013, Dany Laferrière hailed the Giller Prize nominee 
as “one of Quebec’s great literary stylists” (qtd. in Woods).
4 Snauwaert makes important connections between La petite fille qui aimait trop les 
allumettes and Jean François Beauchemin’s Le jour des corneilles (2004) and points (as does 
Boivin) to the relevance of Réjean Ducharme’s classic precursor text, L’avalée des avalés 
(1966). Her exploration of such “family resemblances” includes the trope of family romance 
in the novel. Paterson provides a feminist analysis of gender identity in the text. English 
criticism of Soucy’s text is so far limited to Choplin’s and Whelan’s articles.
5 Jameson’s concept of “worldness” is useful insofar as subjective perception and object-
ive material detail converge in Alice’s narrative; see his discussion of “Magical Narratives” 
in The Political Unconscious. “In contrast to realism,” he argues, “the inner-worldly objects” 
of the romance setting such as “landscape or village, forest or mansion . . . are somehow 
transformed into folds in space, into discontinuous pockets of homogen[e]ous time and 
102 Scl/Élc
heightened symbolic closure, such that they become tangible analoga or perceptual vehicles 
for world in its larger phenomenological sense” (112).
6 Prior to her gallery tour, the sound of Alice’s surname, “soissons,” prompts only the 
vague “impression that the word had something to do with me, that it belonged to the 
most intimate part of me” (47). It is of course not incidental that Soucy’s “soissons de 
coëtherlants” play out the overdetermined plot of a moribund, waning aristocracy via the 
familiar trope of the portrait gallery, which once again pointedly situates Alice’s family 
in a broader cultural genealogy of decadent aristocracy or “slutty” nobility spanning the 
French Regency and English Restoration periods to the nineteenth-century fin de siècle and 
beyond (as the examples of Poe, Wilde, or Restoration dramatists such as Richard Sheridan 
might remind us).
7 Russell West-Pavlov notes the idea of “incommensurable timeframes juxtaposed upon 
one another” as a particular “manifestation” of postmodern theory generally (150), but 
Jameson is responsible for recuperating the concept via Bloch (Political 97; Postmodernism 
307). Originally published in 1932 and reprinted in his Erbschaft dieser Zeit (1935), Bloch’s 
work on “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics” was translated into English 
by Mark Ritter in the New German Critique in the late 1970s; a more recent translation of 
Erbschaft dieser Zeit, Heritage of Our Times, by Neville Plaice and Stephen Plaice, renders 
the chapter on non-synchronism as “Summary Transition: Non-Contemporaneity and 
Obligation to Its Dialectic” (97-148). My references are to the latter unless otherwise noted.
8 See Boivin. I am following both Bloch and Jameson in stressing, on the other hand, 
the “constitutive” features of historical processes. As Jameson puts it, “Just as overt revolu-
tion is no punctual event . . . but brings to the surface . . . struggles . . . at work in the whole 
course of social life that precedes it . . . so also the overtly ‘transitional’ moments of cultural 
revolution are themselves but the passage to the surface of a permanent process in human 
societies, of a permanent struggle between the various coexisting modes of production. The 
triumphant moment in which a new systemic dominant gains ascendancy is therefore only 
the diachronic manifestation of a constant struggle for the perpetuation and reproduction 
of its dominance” (Political 97; emphasis added). Like Bloch, Jameson emphasizes a form of 
“perpetual cultural revolution” that is a “deeper and more permanent constitutive structure” 
of history than discrete “events” in history (97).
9 I echo Gervais, in “L’art de se brûler les doigts,” who argues that the “irreducible 
illegibility” of Alice’s scribbles represents the reader’s own projection and perpetuation of 
Alice’s “misunderstandings”: “Notre lecture ne vient pas dissiper la méprise, elle en génère 
un nouvelle, à notre insu évidemment; tel est pris qui croyait prendre” (393). Assistance 
from unpublished translation by Adrien Guyot (9).
10 On Henry James’s conceit of the “reader trap” and an analysis of “the reading effect” 
as a performative “repetition of the scene dramatized in the text,” see Felman’s discussion 
of The Turn of the Screw in Writing and Madness (141-247).
11 What initially appears as the “impossibility” of textual form emerges in this theor-
etical context as a distinctive example of Jameson’s “postmodern ‘fantastic historiography.’” 
In his formulation, “fantastic historiography” takes two forms, one of which “mimes” reality 
in a “new free play with the past,” the other of which is “purely” inventive in its “collage 
effects” (Postmodernism 368, 369). Soucy’s text reflects elements of both strains as outlined 
by Jameson, particularly the latter, in addition to the “fantastic” element of translating the 
past’s untranslatable trace.
12 As I have intimated, the various levels of translation at play might be thought of in 
relation to Jakobson’s categories of the intralingual (Alice as translator); the intersemiotic 
(the absent hand that translates her “loops”); and the interlingual (the literary translator of 
Soucy’s source text). See Derrida (173).
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13 See Venuti’s recent works for his distinction between the “hermeneutic model” of 
translation and the “instrumental model.” His theory and practice are notably influenced 
by Derrida’s revisionist work on translation.
14 Notably, Derrida’s theory of translation’s reproduction and irreducible difference 
— also figures in Soucy’s text through the visual trope of twins and doubling, an “inter-
dependent” relationship mirroring that between source texts and their translated “twins.” 
Before the fire that alters Ariane beyond recognition, Alice and her twin are “cherub[s],” “as 
much alike as two bubbles,” but even then, Alice notes, “she wasn’t me” (94). Her fantasy of 
a literally transparent (“bubble”) mode of replication is ultimately revealed when she seeks 
to “double” Ariane “with the child that will emerge . . . from my body”: “[T]his cherub will 
be like a bubble to me, . . . and I’ll call her Ariane in memory of the Punishment” (136-37).
15 The Ear of the Other (153; qtd. in Chamberlain 265). See also Derrida for an influen-
tial analysis of the “both necessary and impossible” endeavour of translation (174).
16 For translation theorists such as Venuti, who uphold “foreignization” on ethical and 
anti-imperialist grounds, the emphasis here would fall on the “more” of “more or less.” In 
Christopher Rollason’s words, “for Venuti, a translation should not read as if it were an 
original” but should (like Ariane after the fire) “bear the visible signs of its translatedness.”
17 Traditionally, from the more “instrumentalist” pole, literary translation has been 
undervalued as merely derivative of the original, a matter of mere reproduction. In her 
excellent discussion of the gendered “metaphorics of translation,” Chamberlain critiques 
the influential Benjaminian trope of the echo (in “The Translator’s Task”) as reinforcing 
conceptions of translation’s subordinate status (255). Fischman comments that “Literary 
translation does not always enjoy a comfortable seat at the literary table. This is due partly 
to ignorance of just what it is that we do and how we do it, [and] partly to a misguided 
notion that being obliged to read a work in translation betrays a reader’s ignorance, so that 
translation is perceived as something shameful, an activity to be hidden or camouflaged. 
How many times have you heard someone say apologetically that she has ‘only’ read a book 
in translation?”
18 “[A]ll media are active metaphors in their power to translate experience into new 
forms” (McLuhan 57). In terms of Benjamin’s work, see not only “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), but also “The Author as Producer” (1934), in 
which Benjamin argues for a reconceptualization of literary genres in view of the technical 
factors affecting modernity: that is, an awareness of how new media such as cinema will 
translate and transform old forms.
19 At the same time, as Michael Cronin has demonstrated, the historical relationship 
between translation and print technology is deeply intertwined (474). On the “message” 
of handwriting, conversely, as a sign of presence, intimacy, and originality, and as imbued 
with an expressivist ethos of individualism, see Trubek (34-36).
20 Perhaps unsurprisingly, McLuhan’s categories of the preliterate, literate, and post-
literate society map onto what Bloch would have recognized as the coexistence of non-
synchronous realities: “Electric speed mingles the cultures of prehistory with the dregs 
of industrial marketeers, the nonliterate with the semiliterate and the postliterate” (16).
21 See, for example, Florey, who calls for a revival of the “arts” of penmanship and 
cursive script in schools. Noting the thousand years that it took for Sumerian writing to 
“disappear completely,” Trubek, in contrast, concludes that “Handwriting is not going 
anywhere soon. But it is going” (41).
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